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INTRODUCTION

On January 23, 1990, in the first month of the centennial year
of the article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis entitled,
The Right to Privacy,' a federal court held that the Borough of
Barrington, New Jersey violated a resident's constitutional right of
privacy when an agent of the Borough published the fact that the
resident was infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Doe v.
Borough of Barrington2 is one of a handful of federal court cases
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
The article is dated December 15, 1890.
2. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D. N.J.). See also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir.
1963); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Carter v. Broadlawns
Medical Center, 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987). The court in Doe v. Barrington
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that have found violations of the constitutional right to privacy in the
dissemination of information about a person by the government. Doe
and other decisions that have found privacy violations under the
Constitution in the dissemination and compelled disclosure of information by the government reflect a new branch of the right to
informational privacy that Warren and Brandeis forcefully advocated
a century ago. These decisions are part of an incipient development
in our legal system which grants constitutional protection for invasions
of informational privacy by the government when the invasion does
not occur by methods that constitute a "search" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. Since the right involved in these cases limits
access to information by the government, and since the right is
independent of the fourth amendment, I refer to the right throughout
this article by the rather encumbering title of, the unencumbered
constitutionalright to informationalprivacy.
This important, emerging right is linked to the intellectual tradition, rights theory and concept of privacy that are reflected in The
Right To Privacy, Warren and Brandeis' essay of a century ago.
Connecting this privacy rights development to The Right to Privacy
will proceed by: first, examining the enduring jurisprudential features
of that article; second, tracing how Louis Brandeis and Edward
Bloustein bridged tort and constitutional informational privacy rights
through the jurisprudence that developed from the article; and, third,
examining the features and implications of the emerging unencumbered constitutional right to informational privacy.
A. THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY:
NATURAL LAW AND CONVENTIONAL MORALITY AS A BASIS FOR THE
LEGAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY

In this centennial year of the publication of the Warren and
Brandeis article there will likely be many celebrations in academic
publications. This is as it should be; the article has acquired legendary
status in the realm of legal scholarship.
It is likely that The Right To Privacy has had as much impact
on the development of law as any single publication in legal periodicals. It is certainly one of the most commented upon and cited articles

spoke of the right "of" privacy; Warren and Brandeis referred to the right "to"
privacy in the title of their article. I will use the right of privacy and the right to
privacy interchangeably throughout this article. The possible significance of this
semantical difference will not be addressed in this article.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

in the history of our legal system.' It is difficult to imagine a more
successful piece of scholarship. The article has acquired a special
place in the fantasies of those who toil in the dusty basements of law
libraries or sit bleary-eyed in front of a computer screen researching
and writing with the hope that their efforts will produce insights that

will dramatically shape legal history. The official history of the legal
right of privacy, as expressed in numerous publications, springs the
right eo instanti from the pen of Warren and Brandeis in 1890.
The call for legal recognition of a right to privacy by Warren
and Brandeis has been said to be the birth of the legal right to privacy
in so many legal periodicals and judicial opinions that it has become
4
an academic cliche.
The dearth of legal literature on the subject of privacy, and of
privacy as an explicit ground for relief in case law prior to 1890, is
one of the reasons that the historic birth of the right of privacy is
traced to the Warren and Brandeis article. However, as others have
observed,5 this view underplays the treatment of privacy issues in
literature and philosophy that predated the article and the legal
precedent construing the fourth and fifth amendments 6 that provided
protection for privacy. Placing the historical beginning of the legal

3. Numerous scholars have made this observation. See Davis, What Do We
Mean By "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REv. 1, 3 (1959); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort
Law and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional
as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REV. 611, 612 (1968); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAur. L. REv. 383,
383 (1960); J. T. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, 1-8 (1989);
see also, summary of authors characterizing importance of the article and textual
discussion in, Barron, Warren & Brandeis, The Right. To Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1890): Demystifying A Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 875, 876
and accompanying footnotes (1979) [hereinafter Barron).
4. For examples of courts tracing the right to privacy to the article, see Rhodes
v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); Daly Times Democrat v. Graham,
162 So. 2d 474, 476 (1964); Nader v. GMC, 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970).
5. For accounts of the historical, cultural and social context in which Warren

and Brandeis wrote the article and an analysis of influences on the article see D.
PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PREss, 3 (1972); Barron, supra note 3; Schoenmen,
Privacy: Philosophical Dimension, 21 AM. PHL. Q., 199, 202-04 (1984). The earliest
discussion of privacy in appellate court opinions appears to be in 1881 by a Michigan
court in Demay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881); Judge Cooley a year
earlier in his intitial treatise on the Law of Torts included the "right to be let alone"
as a class of tort rights. In addition, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1873 published
the first explicit philosophical exposition on privacy, J.F. STEPHEN, LEBERTY, EQUALrTY, FRATERNrrY (1873).
6. See, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that government
compelled production of a person's private papers violated the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments).
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right to privacy at the time of the Harvard Law Review publication
also understates the significance of the groundswell of moral rights,
of which the authors were undoubtedly sensitive.
Warren and Brandeis recognized that it was time for the legal
system to expressly recognize and protect privacy rights which had
long been valued in the moral and social relations of persons in
society. Harry Wellington has observed that the article was, "extraordinary ... especially for its attempt to fashion a legal principle from
changes in moral perception . . . . -'7 Warren and Brandeis suggested
that the core principle at stake in privacy cases was the principle of
"inviolate personality." Wellington's view is that Warren and Brandeis drew this core principle from conventional morality. As such,
the argument for recognition of a right to privacy was ultimately
grounded on natural law philosophy. But it was natural law in the
general and contemporary sense, where morality that develops from
social interaction and everyday moral discourse is an appropriate
source for common law legal rights. The article refers to "invasions
of privacy" numerous times. The concept of "invasion of privacy"
is employed without explication. Such is not necessary because its
meaning is plain. The reader understands the term to mean what it
does in ordinary life situations and in conventional morality. References to privacy in the article were invitations to courts to incorporate
their intuitive sense of losses or invasions of privacy in the elaboration
of common law privacy rights.
The jurisprudential tradition of the article has also been traced
to natural law views of a more classic kind by James Barron in an
article that contends that the conceptual foundation for the argument
advanced by Warren and Brandeis was laid by E.L. Godkin, in an
article published in Scribner's Magazine. Godkin's article considered
"the right to decide how much knowledge . . . of [an individual's]
own private . . . affairs . . . the public at large shall have", to be a
natural right. The natural law foundation for the right to privacy
advocated in the article was fully affirmed by the first high court to
recognize the right to privacy as part of that state's common law.
7. See Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes in Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 249 (1973).
8. See Barron, supra note 3, at 887; Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: IV.-

To His Own Reputation, 8

SCUBNER'S

MAGAZINE

58, 65 (July 1890). Godkin

considered that a legal tort remedy for invasions of privacy by the press was
impractical; he apparently held that belief and was unpersuaded by the arguments in
the article in support of recognition of a tort right to privacy. Id. Warren and
Brandeis cited to the Godkin article twice.
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Endorsing the reasoning of the article, the Georgia Supreme Court
concluded that the "right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts
9
of nature . . . and . . . is therefore derived from natural law."
The article focused a good deal of space on the excesses of the
press and the loss of privacy that can be caused by the publication of
information and images. Dean Prosser irreverently suggested that
inspiration for the article was prompted by a gossip column in a
Boston paper that detailed a social affair of the Warrens in Boston.
Recent scholarship has demonstrated that it is unlikely that this was
the motivation for the article and has offered alternative explanations
for the article's genesis. However inauspicious the origins of the
article may have been, 10 the discussion by the authors about the
essential nature and foundations of the right to privacy has endured
and played an important role in the evolution of the right over the
last century.
The article contains a theoretical perspective that is an offshoot
of the natural law foundations of the right to privacy. The discussion
by the authors of the content and essence of the right has provided a
basis for an approach to privacy that permeates opinions and scholarly
writings both in law and in other disciplines. The core theoretical
concepts and assumptions employed in the article view privacy as a
condition and right that is essentially tied to human dignity, the
principle of equal respect for persons, and the notion of personhood
itself. These views were expressed as part of the thesis that privacy is
9. See Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68
(1905). There are numerous brands of natural law philosophy. A full discussion is
beyond the scope of this article. Natural law is a view of law that recognizes that a
central source of law is in society's view of morality and justice. Under this view it
is approj~riate for a judge to look beyond positive rules and principles to notions of
morality in society to decide cases. Natural law philosophy is traceable at least as far
back as the Greek philosophers, see generally CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE, (1982). The
idea that rights emanate from the nature of man is perhaps the core notion of natural
law philosophy. This classic view is reflected in Pavesich. Contemporary natural law
writers focus on morality as it develops from social interaction and everyday moral
discourse. This conventional morality is a source of the moral principles of contemporary natural law. See, e.g., RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW (1977);
Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 UNv. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982); Wellington,
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).

10. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). For a debunking of
Prosser's view, see Barron, supra note 3, and Pember, supra note 5.
Several scholars have viewed the article as a reflection of the social class of the
authors. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 347-48 (1967); Barron, supra note
3; and Pember, supra note 5.

1990:4791

LEGACY OF WARREN AND BRANDEIS

part of a more general right. The more general right was said to be
the "right to immunity of person," the "right to be let alone," and
the "right to one's own personality."" The authors also suggested,
in a related observation, that the core principle at stake in privacy
cases was the principle of "inviolate personality.' ' 2 Warren and
Brandeis thus viewed privacy as an essential part of personhood.
B. ON PRIVACY AND PERSONHOOD: BLOUSTEIN, FEINBERG, BENN
AND "THE E.T. HYPOTHETICAL"

The notions advanced by Warren and Brandeis were more fully
refined in a very important article written by Edward Bloustein in
1964.'1 Bloustein argued that the recognition of the right of privacy
in legal writings and judicial opinions reflects a concern by writers
and courts for protecting human dignity and personal autonomy.
Bloustein focussed on Warren and Brandeis' view that the principle
of inviolate personality was the core value that was protected by
privacy. He found that this principle posited "the individual's independence, dignity and integrity; it defines man's essence as a unique
and self-determining being.' 4 His article further demonstrated that
recognition of the right to privacy in judicial opinions reflected a
concern by courts for protecting human dignity.
These theoretical perspectives can be illustrated by the following
hypothetical. Suppose that an extraterrestrial (E.T.) lands on earth
near one of the accredited AALS law schools. E.T. wanders into the
law school and runs across Student A. E.T. and Student A begin a
casual conversation. Student B approaches them. E.T. points to B
and says to A, "That is an interesting bag of skin and bones."
Student A responds, "But that is more than a bag of skin and bones,
that is a person." E.T., "What is the difference between a bag of
skin and bones and a person?" Student A, "A person has a name,
an identity, a personality, and certain basic rights as against the
government and other individuals." E.T., "What are those rights?"
Student A, "The most central are the right to decide fundamental
matters for yourself, the right to a minimum amount of respect from
the government and other individuals, and the right to privacy. When
11. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
12. Id.

13. Bloustein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
962 (1964) [hereinafter Bloustein]; cf., Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 32 (1967).
14. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 971.
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these rights are provided to someone, then we say that individual has
human dignity."
Joel Feinberg, the moral philosopher, has also commented upon
the essential relationship between rights, human dignity and respect
for persons:
Having rights enable us to "stand up like men," to look
others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the
equal of anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights
is not to be unduly but properly proud to have the minimal
self-respect that is worthy of the love and esteem of others.
Indeed, respect for persons (this is an intriguing idea) may
simply be respect for their rights, so that one cannot be the
one without the other; and what is called "human dignity"
may simply be the recognizable capacity to assert claims."
An influential voice in explicitly connecting up the right to privacy
and respect for persons' principles has been that of the philosopher
Stanley Benn.16 Benn contends that the essence of the wrong that
occurs through invasions of privacy from unlicensed observations of
someone is lack of respect for the subject as a person.
The respect-for-persons'-human-dignity basis for the right to
privacy views privacy as an essential feature of those rights that we
hold as persons. As I have suggested, Warren, Brandeis, Bloustein,
and Benn view privacy as part of those rights we have as persons,
and as rights that preserve the essence of us as persons by granting
us respect and preserving human dignity. The right to privacy has
been defended by scholars from many fields and by jurists on several
7
additional grounds. Some argue that privacy is an intrinsic good.
Others argue that privacy is an essential condition for relationships
of love, friendship, and trust and for the promotion of personal
autonomy and mental health.' 8 The voluminous, unending and brillant
debate about privacy in philosophy and other disciplines is one that I
15. Feinberg The Nature And Value Of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243, 252
(1970).
16. See, Benn Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NoMos XIII:
PRIVACY (1971).

17. See Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PiLosoPHicAL DI-

MENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403 (F.D. Schoeman ed. 1984); Benn, Privacy,
Freedom, and Respect For Persons, in NoMos XIII: PRIVACY (1971); Reiman, Privacy,

Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26 (1976).
18. See Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Rachels, Why Privacy is
Important, 4 PHIn. & PUB. AFF. 323 (1975).
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do not directly address in this article. At this juncture, my contention
is simply that the jurisprudential assumptions and features of the
Warren and Brandeis article, as embellished by jurists and scholars
like Bloustein, has endured and influenced the development of legal
rights of informational privacy. This tradition may be loosely summarized as the natural law, respect for persons, human dignity
intellectual foundation for the right to privacy.
II.

GENERAL FEATURES OF THE LEGAL RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL
PRIVACY

One of the branches of the legal right to privacy that has evolved
in the last century concerns itself with the extent to which persons are
able to limit access to information about themselves. The right is
expressed as a person's right to "control,"' 9 "limit access to," or
"determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is to be communicated to others." 20 I shall refer to this
right generally as the right to informational privacy and set as the
right's major principle the claim of a person to a right to decide who
shall have access to personal or intimate information about her.
Numerous branches of the right to informational privacy have
sprouted in our legal system in the last century. The right is granted
in the common law of torts, 2' contracts, 22 estates, 23 federal and state
constitutions, 25 federal and state statutes, 27 and federal2 and state
agency regulations.2 9 The account that I give of the legal right to
informational privacy is a general one. As such, it does not address
many of the distinctions that are reflected in the cases, common law
19. See Fried, supra note 18, at 482.
20. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
21. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93
Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 B, D.
22. See Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 So.2d 824 (1973).
23. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D.
Ohio 1965).
24. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
25. See People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1974).
26. See Federal Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (1988).
27. See California Right to Financial Privacy Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 747076, 7480, 7485-93 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 290 (dd-3) (Supp. III 1985) (providing for strict confidentiality for drug and alcohol abuse health care records).
29. See PA. STAT. ANN. 50, § 7111 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (providing for strict
confidentiality for mental health treatment records).
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doctrine, and statutory or regulatory norms that are involved in
adjudicating privacy claims. However, it does fit in a general sense
much of the law on the legal right to privacy.
In evaluating the features of the legal right to informational
privacy it is important to distinguish between informational privacy
as a factual condition of life, and informational privacy as a legal
right. Privacy is sometimes employed to describe the presence or
absence of a factual condition of life. This is the condition of limiting
acquaintance with personal affairs. As a factual condition of life,
privacy is something that does or does not exist. It is something that
may be lost or gained. The sense of privacy as a condition of life is
reflected in everyday conversations with expressions like, "Please give
me some privacy," or "I don't have any privacy," or "Make the call
in the other room so you can have privacy." An invasion of privacy
occurs when the factual condition of privacy has been lost or altered
by someone in circumstances where that person is presumptively
responsible for the loss of privacy. Whether the invasion of privacy
is a violation of the legal right to privacy depends upon whether the
legal requirements for establishing violation of a right have been met.
The legal right to privacy shares the characteristics of defeasibility
that other similar rights possess. The rights consist of prima facie
claims of injury and the absence of excusing conditions or defenses. 0
The right to informational privacy entails a claim that someone
has acquired or disseminated personal or intimate information about
you without your consent. This claim initially involves an assertion
by the aggrieved party that the condition of privacy has been lessened
or lost (that privacy has been invaded). If this claim is demonstrated,
and the party that has caused the invasion of privacy cannot demonstrate a defense or other excusing circumstances, the person's right to
privacy has been violated. Under this view of the right to informational privacy, privacy may be invaded but no legal right to privacy
violated. An example of this would be when the police enter and
search someone's home pursuant to a search warrant that has been
issued by a court after a showing of probable cause. The person's
privacy has been invaded because intimate, and perhaps personal,
information has been acquired about the person without her consent.
However, no legal right to privacy has been violated; the government
is excused in the circumstances because the search was made pursuant
to a properly authorized warrant.
30. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, in

OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, NEW SERIES,

PROCEEDIN

S

XLIX (1948-1949); Gavison, Privacy

and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 461 n.123 (1980).
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When The Right To Privacy was written, dissemination of information through the press was the privacy-invading technology of the
day. Therefore, a primary focus of the article was invasions of privacy
by publication of information by the print media. The argument for
recognition of a common law tort right to remedy this invasion of
privacy of course recognized the defeasible nature of the right to
privacy. In the article Warren and Brandeis discussed several limita-

tions on the right.3 These limitations included consent and informa-

tion that it was in the public interest to know. The tort that ultimately
emerged to deal with loses of privacy by dissemination of information
by the media is generally referred to as the Public Disclosure tort.
Rights under the Public Disclosure tort have been severely limited by

first amendment defenses.12 Other restrictions on the tort right for
disclosure of private facts have been developed by the courts that
were not anticipated by the authors, although the development itself
was.

33

Invasion of privacy through the unauthorized acquisition of
personal or intimate information was not the focus of the Warren
and Brandeis article. However, state courts responded to invasions of
privacy through the private use of electronic surveillance by invoking
Warren and Brandeis and providing common law protection. The tort
privacy right that evolved for invasions of privacy by private persons
and businesses for the acquisition of information is commonly known
as the Privacy Intrusion tort . 4 The Public Disclosure and Privacy

Intrusion torts embody the core of our legal system's tort right to

informational privacy.

31. The major limitations on the right discussed in the article were: (1)
publication of information that is in the public interest is not actionable, (2)
communications are not actionable if they would be privileged in defamation law,
(3) oral publications were not actionable, and (4) consent or publication was a
defense. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-19.
32. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (first amendment
protects dissemination of rape victim's name when lawfully acquired from public
record).
33. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (public figures
may not recover under public disclosure tort).
34. See Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931) (holding invasion of
privacy through tapping of a telephone a wrong for which common law remedy was
available). The Rhode's court invoked the article's reference to technological threats
to privacy, writing, "[tihe evil incident to the invasion of privacy of the telephone is
as great as that occasioned by unwarranted publicity in newspapers and by other
means of a man's private affairs for which courts have granted the injured person
redress." Id. at 47.
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In 1960, Dean William Prosser wrote an article on privacy that
has been very influential in the formulation of tort privacy rights."
He inventoried several hundred appellate court decisions in which
privacy had been employed by courts in assessing the validity of the
claim for tort damages. From his account of these cases emerged four
torts. These include the Public Disclosure and Privacy Intrusion torts
mentioned above as well as two others-the False Light and Privacy
Appropriation torts.3 6 Much has been written about Prosser's four
part disparate tort theory. The question of the sufficiency and usefulness of Prosser's view is beyond the scope of this article.17 I only
make two contentions: (1) that cases that have come to be viewed as
within the appropriate scope of the Public Disclosure and Privacy
Intrusion torts involve informational privacy rights, and (2) that courts
treat these torts as having origins in the Warren and Brandeis article
and as reflections of the human dignity, respect for persons, view of
the right of to privacy.3"
A. THE HUMAN DIGNITY RESPECT FOR PERSONS THEORY OF
PRIVACY: A LINKAGE BETWEEN INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS IN
TORT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Federal constitutional rights are rights that individuals have against
the government; the federal constitution does not grant rights to
persons that are wronged by non-governmental entities such as private
persons or businesses. Tort rights are rights that individuals have
against private persons and business entities. This distinguishing feature of constitutional and common law tort rights has led some
commentators to conclude that there is no significant linkage between
the right to informational privacy in constitutional law and tort.3 9 The
35. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960).
36. Id. These four torts have been embraced by the Restatement of Torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 B, C, D, E.
37. See Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HAgv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 247

(1977); Bloustein, supra note 13.
38. See Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931); Daily Times Democrat

v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). The modern cases tend to rely more on the

four part restatement language than on the reasoning of the article. The article is

generally invoked. Interestingly, courts do not recognize nearly as much tension in
the Bloustein and Prosser view as philosophers and academics. See, e.g., Nader v.
GMC, 255 N.E.2d 765, 768-69 (N.Y. 1970) (invoking the article, Bloustein, Prosser,
and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS as part of a summary about the tort right

to privacy).

39. See, J.T. McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 5.7 (B)
(1989). McCarthy also suggests that constitutional privacy rights differ from torts in
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connection, however, between informational privacy rights in constitutional law and torts is in the nature of the injury and not in the
character of the actor that causes the injury. It is the loss of the
condition of privacy and the intellectual tradition that is the foundation of privacy rights that links informational privacy rights in tort
and constitutional law. Brandeis and Bloustein again were major
players in demonstrating this.
Thirty-eight years after publication of the article, Brandeis, as
Justice of the Supreme Court, had the opportunity to examine one of
the most basic and important questions involving informational privacy in our society. The Court was asked to consider whether the
Constitution provides protection for citizens when the government
places a wiretap on their telephone and records their conversations.
Olmstead v. United States" came to the Court as a question of
construction of the fourth amendment concept of "search." A majority of the Court applied a property-trespass view of the fourth
amendment and concluded that, since there was no physical entry
onto Olmstead's property, he was not searched by the electronic
surveillance of his conversations. Brandeis dissented in an influential
opinion that has been cited almost as often as the article; the dissent
was an extension of the core ideas of the article to this latest
technological threat. The authors of the Constitution, he wrote,
conferred as against the government "the right to be let alone-the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."04 ' The Brandeis dissent established a linkage between tort and
constitutional informational privacy rights. Each protects individuals
against invasions of privacy, a right we have as persons under the
constitution and common law.
Bloustein persuasively argued that Olmstead established this linkage. He found that the "parallelism" between the article and Brandeis'
dissent in Olmstead suggested that Brandeis believed that the principle
of inviolate personality was intended to be protected under the fourth
amendment .42 The electronic surveillance by the government that was
at issue in Olmstead shared a characteristic with the electronic surveillance by private persons that was protected by the common law
that the latter protects against the dissemination of information where the former
does not. As the later sections of this article indicate, informational privacy interests
are implicated in some circumstances by the dissemination of information by the
government.
40. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
41. Id.at 478.
42. Id.
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of torts; both were directed at a similar wrong - the invasion of
informational privacy.
A further linkage between constitutional and tort information
privacy rights is found in the extent to which there are natural law
underpinnings to both. The proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures is part of those liberties that are viewed as fundamental
because they are recognized in longstanding traditions of morality in
Anglo-American law. Brandeis argued for Supreme Court recognition
that wiretapping by the government constitutes such a significant
invasion of privacy that it violates the fundamental liberties of each
person who is protected by the Constitution and the fourth amend'43
ment concept of "search.
B. THE ENCUMBERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFORMATION PRIVACY
RIGHT: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROSCRIPTION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The role of the fourth amendment in protecting informational
privacy is often ignored. In law schools the law of search and seizure
is compartmentalized in the curriculum, and in the minds of many
faculty and students, as exclusively a part of criminal law involving
criminal procedural rights. Lawyers that work with search and seizure
issues every day probably recognize that government searches of the
home and electronic surveillance of conversations are invasions of
privacy. But they are not in the habit of speaking (or thinking) of an
"unreasonable search" as violating that person's constitutional right
to informational privacy.
This is surprising because privacy has explicitly been spoken of
as a core reason for constitutional limitations on government searches
for nearly a century." The current standard for whether government
43. Bloustein, supra note 13, at 976-77.
44. Perhaps the first fourth-amendment case to invoke the concept of privacy
was Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (holding that government compelled
production of a person's private papers violated the fourth and fifth Amendments).
Justice Bradly speaking of the historical principles employed in Entick v. Carrington
and Three Other King's Messengers, 19 Howell's States Trials, 1029 (1765) (where
the seizure of private books and papers under a general search warrant was found to
be actionable in trespass for damages) stated that the principles of Entick "apply to
all invasions on the part of the government and its employ[eels of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life." It probably is the case that the fourth
amendment is the legal norm that has most been spoken of by appellate courts as
protecting persons against "invasion or losses of privacy." Boyd at 630.
An illuminating example is in Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White the Court held that the surreptitious recording of a
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action constitutes a "search ' 4 refers to "privacy" three times, and,
in considering whether many searches are reasonable, the Court has
adopted a standard that explicitly requires an assessment of the extent
to which the search invades the subject's privacy. 46
In a previous section of this article, I suggested that it is useful
to think of the legal right to informational privacy as expressed
through claims brought by individuals against private persons, and
government and business entities, who have caused them to lose the
condition of informational privacy. If the search and seizure cases
are viewed from this perspective, they clearly are expressions of the
constitutional right to informational privacy. The electronic surveillance of conversation, the extraction of blood, and the entry into and
physical examination of persons and the content of a home, constitute
governmental invasions of privacy. The condition of limiting acquaintance with personal affairs has been lost because the government has
acquired personal and intimate information about the individual. The
legal protection against these losses of informational privacy is provided for under the Constitution. The protection mostly takes the
form of judicially-crafted remedies flowing from construction by
courts of the restraints imposed on the government by the proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Traditional remedies for
compensatory damages are regularly sought in constitutional tort
actions when informational privacy rights are violated under the
fourth amendment. 7
conversation by a participant who was wearing a concealed transmitter was not a
"search" of the speaker because he had no "reasonable expectation of privacy" in
the conversation. Harlan dissented. He argued that the holding was wrong because
it failed to treat a significant invasion of privacy by the government as a "search"

and therefore "misse[d] the mark" of the warrant requirement which was to distribute
the risk of loss of privacy to those persons that an impartial magistrate determined

probably engaged in illegal activity. By taking participant monitoring bugging cases

out of the fourth amendment, the Court had shifted the burden of loss of privacy
to any citizen that law enforcement officials chose to monitor. White, 401 U.S. at
789-90.
45. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (search determined by
whether person had "legitimate expectation of privacy in information", both a
"subjective" and "reasonable" expectation of privacy required before expectation is
"legitimate").
46. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (whether non-law enforcement
"search" is reasonable requires weighing governmental interests with personal privacy
that is invaded by search).
47. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides for a civil
cause of action in federal court for violations of the Constitution. Violations of the
fourth amendment are a major source of civil litigation under § 1983, See also S.
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For these reasons, I think it is useful and appropriate to speak
of fourth amendment restraints on government action in particular
cases as expressions of the constitutional right to informational privacy. However, the extent of constitutional protection against invasions of privacy by the government is encumbered by the threshold
fourth amendment requirement that the information be acquired by
the government through a search. Traditionally, the search requirement encumbered the scope of the right to informational privacy in
two ways: the right was limited to government invasions of privacy
by specific methods that were employed as part of the enforcement
of the criminal law. The application of the fourth amendment to
invasions of privacy through testing of employees for drug and alcohol
use by the government extended informational privacy rights beyond
those limited activities which acquired information as part of criminal
law enforcement. 4 However, the informational privacy right was still
encumbered by the search requirement.
The restriction of constitutional informational privacy rights to
government searches leaves a large area of governmental invasions of
privacy that are beyond the reach of the Constitution. Under current
construction of the Constitution much of the information that a
person discloses to someone may be acquired by the government
without a search of the person within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.49 Therefore, the gathering and use of most information
that is acquired from a source other than the individual would be
immune from constitutional protection. This would be the case irreCIvIm RIGHTS AND CIVI LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983
(2d ed. 1986).
48. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1429, 1413
(1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
49. In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976); and United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the Court held
that information acquired by the government from bank records (Miller), telephone
NAHMOD,

records (Smith) or electronic surveillance of a conversation with one party's consent
(White) was not a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. These
decisions were based upon the principle that if someone voluntarily discloses information to someone then that party has no reasonable expectation of privacy with

respect to that information. As a consequence of this trilogy, the acquisition of
information by the government from someone who has received it from the subject

generally would not constitute a search. Some state courts have not adopted the
voluntary disclosure theory. They adopt a broader expectation of privacy principle

in interpreting their state constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches
and seizures. See, e.g., People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975)
(one-party-consent transmission monitoring of conversation a "search" under Michigan Constitution); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (government
accessing billing records a search of telephone customer).
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spective of the nature of the information. Substantial invasions of
priVacy by the acquisition and dissemination of personally sensitive
or intimate information by the government escape the reach of a
constitutional right to privacy if the right is limited to governmental
activities that constitute searches.
For most of the twentieth century protection for informational
privacy under the Constitution was limited to invasions of privacy by
the government that occurred through searches of a person or her
house, papers or effects. The acquisition of information by the
government by means other than what satisfied the technical requirements of a search were not subject to constitutional restraints; nor
was dissemination or publication of information by the government
prohibited since those activities are clearly not "searches."
C.

INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS INDEPENDENT OF THE

FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE INITIAL BREAK IN YORK V. STORY

The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to squarely hold
that governmental encroachment on informational privacy by means
that did not constitute a search violated the constitutional right to
informational privacy. York v. Story ° is one of those cases in our
legal system which provides support for the proposition that "hard
facts make new law."'" The case presented the Ninth Circuit with
factual allegations of a most serious invasion of privacy by the
government and of an outrageous abuse of power. Angelynn York
claimed that she was required to strip and have photographs taken of
her in the nude by a male police officer when she filed charges in
connection with a complaint of assault and battery. Additional prints
of the pictures were made by other police officers with police equipment and distributed to the personnel of the police department. York
contended that the actions of the officers constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure and also violated her general constitutional right
to be free from governmental invasions of privacy that was part of
"liberty" under the fourteenth amendment.
In overruling the lower court's dismissal of her complaint, the
court held that the distributions of the pictures did not amount to a
fourth amendment search but constituted an "intrusion upon the
security of her privacy ... 52 in violation of the due process clause
50. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
51. This is a variation of the notable quotation by John Campbell when serving
as Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench. He wrote in Ex parte Long (1854) 3 W.R. 19
(1854), "hard cases, it is said, make bad law."
52. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963).
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of the fourteenth amendment. The Constitution provides citizens with
rights against significant invasions of privacy by the government even
if the invasions did not occur through a search. Judge Hamley wrote:
We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than
the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure
from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the
opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity. A search of one's home has been established to
be an invasion of one's privacy against intrusion by the police,
which, if "unreasonable," is arbitrary and therefore banned
under the Fourth Amendment (citation omitted). We do not
see how it can be argued that the searching of one's home
deprives him of privacy, but the photographing of one's nude
body, and the distribution of such photographs to strangers
does not."
There is an unmistakable Brandeisian tone and content to this
language-the right to privacy promotes self-respect and protects
personal dignity. There is also unmistakable parallelism in the basic
reasoning: the constitutional right to privacy is a general right, the
right to be free from "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual .... -54
D. IMPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE CONCEPT BY THE SUPREME
COURT: NIXON V. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND WHALEN V. ROE

York v. Story was an exceptional case and much ahead of its
time. It was decided two years before Griswold v. Connecticut," the
first Supreme Court case to explicitly recognize a right to privacy
under the Constitution independent of the fourth amendment. However, Griswold did not validate the notion of an independent right to
informational privacy. The privacy right articulated by the Court in
Griswold was the right to personal autonomy or independence of
decisionmaking with respect to relationships like marriage. For over
a decade the constitutional rights analysis of York was not followed
56
by other federal circuits.

ing).

53. Id. at 455.
54. Olmsted v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-

55. 381 U.S 479 (1965).
56. The Ninth Circuit initially refused to extend York beyond its facts. In
Baker v. Howard, 419 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1969), the constitutional privacy argument
was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in a case where the police released a police report
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It was not until the 1977-78 term that the Supreme Court gave
impetus to the idea that informational privacy was a constitutionally
protected right in non-search cases. In that term, the Supreme Court
handed down the only two decisions in which it has squarely faced
the question of whether invasions of privacy by government action,
other than a search, violate the Constitution. In both cases, the Court
assumed as a basis of its decision that such a right to privacy enjoyed
protection under the Constitution. However, the Court found in the
particular circumstances of the cases that the right to informational
57
privacy had not been violated. In Nixon v. Administrative Services,
the former President argued that the acquisition, storage and public
access to his taped conversations and private papers under the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (Act), violated his
constitutional right to privacy. The Court recognized that the President's expectation of privacy in the acquired and disseminated information was one that was protected under the Constitution. However,
the interests furthered under the Act by public accessibility to the
information were found to justify the invasion of privacy.
In Whalen v. Roe,5 8 patients and doctors challenged a statutory
scheme in New York that required copies of prescriptions for certain
drugs to be recorded and stored in a centralized governmental computer as violating their constitutional right to privacy. The Court
rejected this claim on the particular facts of the case, but a majority
of the Court assumed that in appropriate circumstances the acquisition
and disclosure by the government of health care information might
violate the constitutional right to privacy of patients. Justice Stevens,
writing for a majority of the Court, identified informational privacy
as one of two branches of the constitutional right to privacy: "The
cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact
involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."19
indicating the plaintiff was suspected of involvement with a crime after the police
department had concluded that he was not. The court distinguished York on the
basis that the invasion of privacy in the case was not as "flagrant" as in York.
57. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
58. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
59. Id. at 598-600. There were two concurring opinions in Whalen by Justice
Brennan and Justice Stewart. Justice Stewart concurs with the understanding that he
does not read the majority opinion, nor Griswold, to recognize a "general interest
in freedom from disclosure of private information" in the Constitution, id. at 609
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Whalen was the first case in which the Court explicitly recognized
there were two branches to privacy rights under the Constitution: the
right to informational privacy (in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters) and the right of privacy-autonomy (independence of decisionmaking). It is especially significant that the authority cited by the
Court for the informational privacy branch included Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead and his reference to a concept that united
the general theory of the right to privacy in the article-the right to be
let alone.60 An official linkage by the Court to the article and the
unencumbered informational privacy right occurs because the majority
in Whalen viewed the informational right to privacy as not limited to
the fourth amendment. This conclusion must necessarily be drawn
from the Court's discussion of the right to privacy as it applied to
the informational gathering activities under the New York statutory
scheme. Justice Stevens again:
We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government
files .... The right to collect and use such data for public
purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory
or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its
roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory
scheme ... evidence[s] a proper concern with, and protection

of, individuals ....61

Neither Whalen nor Nixon held that the acquisition or dissemination of information by the government by means that did not
constitute a search violated the constitutional right to privacy. Yet
the decisions did not close the door on the recognition of an unencumbered right to privacy under the Constitution. On the contrary,
the decisions might properly be interpreted as suggesting that it would
be appropriate for federal and state courts to find violations of the
constitutional right to privacy in circumstances where the government
invasion of privacy was significant and unjustified. This is precisely
what federal and state courts have done.62
(Stewart, J., concurring). His opinion is the only one in Whalen that appears to
reject the notion of an independant right to informational privacy.
60. Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead characterized "the right to be let alone" as

"the right most valued by civilized men." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.25
(1977) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
61. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
62. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Most
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The most notable exception has been the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. This court has viewed an earlier Supreme Court decision,
Paul v. Davis, 63 to significantly limit Whalen. In Paul, a closely
divided court held that publication of a false and defamatory statement about Paul by the Louisville police department did not deprive
him of a liberty that was protected under the fourteenth amendment.
Paul had been referred to in a flyer as an "active shoplifter" although
he had been acquitted of the crime. Justice Rhenquist, writing for a
bare majority of the Court, characterized Paul's major argument as
a "classic claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually
every state."" Concluding that violation of state law by a government
agent did not by itself implicate federal rights protected under the
fourteenth amendment, the majority rejected Paul's procedural due
process argument. 65 The majority also rejected Paul's argument that
the publication violated Paul's constitutional right to privacy because
none of the Court's substantive privacy decisions had held that the
publication of "a record of an official act such as an arrest,""6
violated the Constitution.
Relying upon Paulv. Davis in J.P. v. DeSanti,67 the Sixth Circuit
held that the post adjudication dissemination of social histories of
juveniles did not violate their constitutional right to privacy. 6 The
court in DeSanti found that the dissemination in the two cases, of
courts considering the question, however, appear to agree that privacy of personal
matters is a protected interest."); see also Plant v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir.
1978); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978); Slevin v. City of New York,
551 F. Supp. 917, 930 (where the court lists additional cases); Woods v. White, 689
F. Supp. 874, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1988) ("since Whalen, there has been a consenus
among most courts that a right to privacy exists in certain types of personal
information"); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1987) (As of 1983, "a
majority of courts considering the question [of a right to privacy] had concluded that
a constitutional right of confidentiality is implicated by disclosure of broad range of
personal information ...

.").

In addition to the above, the constitutional right to

informational privacy has been explicitly recognized in several other federal circuits:
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980); Taylor v.
Best, 746 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 982 (1985); Kimberlin v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 788 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1009 (1986). Cf., McElrath v. Califano, 615 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1980); Mangels v.
Pena, 789 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986).
63. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
64. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697 (1976).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 713.
67. 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
68. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1091 (1981).
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social histories and of an arrest, were indistinguishable. The sounder
view is that Paul v. Davis does not at all speak to the informational
privacy right that has been recognized in Whalen and Nixon. The
informational privacy claims in Whalen and Nixon were entirely
different from the constitutional claim in Paul.
A major contention in Paul was that the government action
violated Paul's fourteenth amendment procedural due process right
to a fair hearing. The scope of the fourteenth amendment concepts
of "property" and "liberty" for purposes of procedural due process
was not at issue in Whalen or Nixon. 69 Paul's substantive due process
claim was viewed by the Court as essentially based upon a state
common law defamation theory. In Whalen and Nixon, the parties
challenging the government action did not argue that because the
government agent had committed a tort a constitutional right had
been violated. The central feature of Paul that makes it not controlling, or relevant to cases involving governmental invasions of informational privacy, is the nature of the information that was the
gravamen of the alleged constitutional injury. The defamation in Paul
consisted of a statement which falsely embellished information that
had appeared in a public record . 70 Privacy interests fade and are
almost extinguished for information that has appeared in a public
record. 7' Because of the public character of such information, no
cognizable constitutional privacy right claim is raised by its dissemination.
For these reasons, other federal circuit and district courts that
have considered the question of information disclosure by the government have not adopted the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit. 72 They have
69. Cf. L. TRBmE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 971-72 (1st ed. 1978).
70. See Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal
Matter: Perfecting Privacy Analysis in J.P. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981),
71 GEo. L.J. 219, 222 (1982), for a general critique on DeSanti, that focusses on this
feature of Paul v. Davis, and especially footnote 33 that explains how under Kentucky
law Paul's arrest record was a public record.
71. See Cox v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding first amendment bars
imposing tort liability on media for publishing rape victim's name when it was part
of judicial record in criminal proceedings). In Cox the Court noted: "even the
prevailing [tort] law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests of
privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record."
Id. at 494-95 (relying on the Tentative Draft of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information
about the plaintiff which is already public.) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652
D, comm. c (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
72. See Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Fadjo v. Coon,
633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).
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viewed Paul as holding that the constitutional right to privacy does
not apply to the dissemination of information by the government that
is on the public record. The decisions that have dealt with informational privacy claims based upon governmental acquisition of information have generally not considered Paul v. Davis to be pertinent to
this type of governmental invasions of privacy.
E. ACCEPTANCE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL ELABORATION OF THE
CONCEPT; LOWER FEDERAL COURT AND STATE COURT
DEVELOPMENTS

In contrast to the tentative reception by the Supreme Court,
lower federal and state appellate courts have generally embraced the
notion that informational privacy is protected from governmental
encroachments that do not amount to searches. The right is recognized
as to both the acquisition and dissemination of information by the
government. The California and Alaska cases developing the independent informational privacy right have grounded it on the explicit
right to privacy in the California and Alaska Constitutions. 73 For the
most part, state and federal courts have found the informational
privacy right to be part of those important rights that are implicit in
the concept of "liberty" under both federal and state constitutions .74
Substantive limitations on government action that invades informational privacy is therefore imposed by judicial construction of the due
process clauses of federal and state constitutions.
The richest development has been in cases where the government
compelled disclosure by individuals of personal or intimate information about themselves or others. Many of these decisions have involved
judicially compelled disclosure of health care information through
subpoena of health records or the threat of contempt to health
professionals who refuse to testify about health care information that
is relevant to civil and criminal proceedings. The effect of recognizing
the patient's or client's constitutional right to privacy in health care
information in these instances is to create a constitutionally based
evidentiary or testimonial privilege. 7 Other instances where the inde73. Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977); City
of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970);
but see In re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
74. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
75. See generally Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VELL.
L. REv. 871, 898-992 (1989); Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, 500 So. 2d
533 (Fla. 1987).
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pendent right has been raised has been in challenges to disclosure
requirements that are a condition to public employment or required
of appointed or elected public officials. 76 The right has also surfaced
in challenges to laws which require the reporting of information like
77
child abuse to governmental agencies.
Employment of the right to challenge the publication or dissemination-of information by the government has been less frequent, and
the jurisprudence is less developed, than it is in the instances where
the acquisition of information has been challenged as violating the
constitutional right to privacy. However, the dissemination by the
government 78 of nude photographs of the victim of a crime79 and the
HIV status of citizens has been found to violate the subject's right to
privacy. Other attempts to challenge the dissemination of information
within governmental agencies on the basis that it violates the right to
privacy have been less successful, even though the basic notion that
constitutional privacy interests are implicated in government disclosure
has been generally accepted by the courts before which the arguments
were made.80
III.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

Although the unencumbered right to informational privacy has
been firmly planted in the field of constitutional rights by the judiciary, its contours are still being defined. The right has emerged during
a period of constitutional history where the conceptual framework
and philosophy about the appropriate role of the judiciary in elaborating constitutional rights is in transition. The Burger Court inherited
the Warren Court's legacy of judicial activism and expansion of
constitutional rights. The Warren Court's elaboration of constitutional
rights reflected three major themes. One was nationalization of historic fundamental rights; 8 another was the extension of fundamental
rights to changes in society; 2 the third was construction of the
76. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); Plante v.
Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
77. See Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201, 830 F.2d 789 (7th
Cir. 1987).
78. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373 (N.M. App. 1989); Davis
v. Bucher, 853 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 nn. 4-12 (1968).
82. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Constitution in view of egalitarian values. 3 The themes manifested
themselves in application of criminal procedure rights to the states
through the selective incorporation doctrine, extension of first amendment and privacy rights, and expansion of limitations on the state
and federal government by principles of justice that are embodied in
the equal protection clause.
The conceptual framework that evolved from the elaboration of
rights by the Warren Court was one that required the sorting of rights
in due process cases into "fundamental" and "nonfundamental"
categories, and the sorting of legislative classifications in equal protection cases into those that were formally directed at "suspect"
groups and those that were not. This sorting was done to determine
the appropriate role of the Court in interpreting challenges to government action that were made on due process or equal protection
grounds. If the government action significantly affected "fundamental
rights" or constituted a "suspect classification," the Court's role was
to "strictly" scrutinize the government action to determine whether
important government interests were furthered in the most efficacious
manner. If they were not, the government action was unconstitutional.
If the laws in question did not significantly effect fundamental rights
or involved formal classifications that were not "suspect," the Court's
role was not to review the importance or efficacy of the government
action but rather to defer to the express or implied justifications of
the government and uphold the constitutionality of the law. A consequence of this approach was the calcification of rights into a caste
system. There were preferred rights that, if implicated, almost always
overrode the government action and there was an underclass of rights
that, if implicated, never did.84
The Burger Court included a number of Justices who embraced
a more conservative political and judicial philosophy than their predecessors. So too with the Rehnquist Court today. However, until
very recently the Court has been fragmented and without a philosophical consensus. Initially, the Burger Court adopted the two-tier
caste system approach to consideration of due process and equal
protection claims. However, the Court froze the categories that would
license strict judicial scrutiny and in some instances retarded the
83. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
84. See generally Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAgv. L. Rlv. 1 (1972);
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Justice
Powell's majority and Justice Marshall's dissenting opinions).
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development within those categories. 85 This perpetuated the rigid
classification system and further calcified the caste system of rights.
The political conservatism of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts resulted in an expansion of rights into areas different than those that
had developed in the period of the Warren Court. There has been a
shift from personal rights to economic rights. This is most dramatically illustrated by the elevation of commercial speech to first amendment status by the Burger Court.8 6 When the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts went off on their own in elaborating rights, they did so by
adopting more flexible tests for evaluating the constitutionality of
government action.8 7 Under this philosophy a court's role in scrutinizing laws is more varied. Individual and government interests are
examined, but without the preassigned weights that operate under the
two-tier system. Rights are decided on a more ad hoc basis.
This movement away from the rigid preferred rights approach
toward the flexible balancing of interest approach continues especially
where courts are going in new directions with rights. It is in this sense
that rights analysis. and elaboration under the Constitution is in a
state of transition. The independent constitutional right to informational privacy is an example of this development. The scope of the
88
right is generally determined by the flexible balancing of interest test.
A. CENTRAL FEATURES OF THE BALANCING TEST WHEN INVASIONS
OF PRIVACY OCCUR BY GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION

The unencumbered right to informational privacy has special
force when the government significantly invades the privacy of indi85. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
86. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (example of balancing test applicable to commercial speech). The
Warren Court viewed pure commercial speech as a form of economic regulation that
was subject to the deferential review of the rational basis test. See Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
87. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm.,
447 U.S. 557 (1980); California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm., 453 U.S.
182 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
88. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983) ("An
intermediate standard of review seems in keeping both with the Supreme Court's
reluctance to recognize new fundamental interests requiring a high degree of scrutiny
for alleged infringements, and the Court's recognition that some form of scrutiny
beyond rational relationship is necessary to safeguard the confidentiality interest").
Id. at 1559; see also Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978).
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viduals by compelling disclosure of intimate or highly personal information about them. Much of the jurisprudence that has developed
involves compelled disclosure of health care information or information in financial records. These cases adopt the general principle from
Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead that intrusions into an individual's
privacy must be justified by the government. This general principle
defines the broad contours of the balancing of interest test that
determines whether the right to informational privacy has been violated in a particular case. s9 Initially, the extent to which privacy has
been invaded by the government is evaluated, then the governmental
need for the information is evaluated to determine whether the
invasion of privacy is justified.
1. The Threshold Question: Is The Information Acquired
"Intimate" or of a "Personal Nature"?
Modern society is characterized by information exchange relationships. As a condition for receiving virtually all forms of government largess, persons are required to provide the government with a
considerable amount of information. In performing their legitimate
functions and obligations, government officials need to have access
to certain information about individuals. A great deal of information
must be acquired and disseminated in order for the government to
work the way it is supposed to in a democracy. Any concept of a
right to limit the acquisition and disclosure of information by the
government must take into account the central role of information
acquisition and dissemination activities in our constitutional system.
It is an understanding of this that has contributed to the care with
which the judiciary has dealt with informational privacy right claims.
The courts have rejected invitations to construe the Constitution as
embodying a type of national privacy act that generally restricts
disclosure of information by federal, state and local governmental
entities. 90
89. See United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980)
("Thus, as in most other areas of the law, we must engage in the delicate task of
weighing competing interests. The factors which should be considered in deciding
whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are .
").
90. See Bedford v. Sugarman, 112 Wash. 2d 500, 772 P.2d 486 (1989). After
summarizing the cases that have endorsed the right to informational privacy the court
stated:
From these cases, it appears that the right of confidentiality the Supreme
Court first articulated in Whalen v. Roe, in its broadest application, protects
against disclosure only of certain particularized data, information or pho-
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For the constitutional right of informational privacy to be a
credible concept it is necessary to differentiate, in a principled way,
between those acquisitions and disclosures of information by the
government that violate the Constitution and those that do not. This
requires, initially, that the right only be implicated in cases where the
information acquired or disseminated by the government is the kind
that has been recognized by legal and social norms as significantly
implicating privacy. The extent to which specific types of information
implicate privacy is a by-product of two interrelated factors: the
intrinsic and the consequential features of the information. By "intrinsic" features, I am referring to the degree of intimacy of the
information. "Consequential" features refer to the potential for
harmful consequences to the subject if information is disclosed.
Intimate information is information about a person that is inextricably tied to personhood; it is information that reflects an extension
or expression of the person and deals with the very essence of that
person. The paridigm of intimate information would include information about the naked body and other individual physical features
and one's medical condition; it would include information about
mental processes and states, fantasies, fears, anxieties, illnesses and
family relationships, caring relationships and sexual activities. Nonconsensual acquisition or publication of such information demonstrates a lack of respect to the person and constitutes an affront to
the subject's human dignity. 9'
Some intimate information, if disclosed, could have harmful
consequences to the subject. This might be the case with regard to
medical information such as a person's HIV status, or treatment for
mental illness or drug and alcohol abuse. The potential for adverse
consequences from disclosure, however, is not the core privacy concern with intimate information. It is that the acquisition or dissemination of such information provides access to the subject as a person.
Dissemination of all sorts of information that is not potentially
damaging would tend to cause substantial concern and anxiety to a
reasonable person. There are countless examples. Information that
expresses good or bad feelings toward others, or that exposes a whole
range of personal preferences ranging from sexual pleasures to sleeping
habits, are thought to be "no one's business." Such information is a
tographs describing or representing intimate facts about a person. The case
law does not support the existence of a "general right to nondisclosure of
private information.
Id. at 511-12, 772 P.2d at 492.
91. See supra note 15.
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part of you and you have the right to decide whether someone will
have access to it.92
The special privacy concerns that are raised by intimate information are reflected in numerous social and legal norms in society.
We think it is only appropriate to do many things with our family,
lovers and friends outside of the public glare. Concerns about privacy
have produced numerous state and federal laws which provide strict
confidentiality for health information about drug and alcohol abuse,
mental health treatment, and the condition of being infected with
HIV. 93 The ethical and licensing standards of health professionals
contain proscriptions against betrayal of secrets. 94
Information of a personal nature may not be intimate but may
still implicate privacy values because the subject reasonably perceives
that harmful or undesirable consequences, including embarrassment,
will flow, from disclosure. The paridigm of information that implicates
privacy because of its consequential features is probably much of the
information found in arrest or financial records. Information that
someone has been arrested would not generally say much, if anything,
about the health or personal or family relationships of the subject.
Yet, because disclosure could cause embarrassment and have adverse
consequences to the individual, disclosure could raise serious privacy
concerns. 95 Similarly, much information about financial transactions
92. See generally SCHOEMAN, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHIOSOPH-

ICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403, 406 (F.D. Schoeman ed. 1984)

("I think that what makes things private is in large part their importance to our
conceptions of ourselves and to our relationships with others ....
Selective selfdisclosure provides the means through which people value personal experiences which
are intrinsically or objectively valueless.").
93. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
94. See AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957);
EthicalPrinciplesof Psychologists, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGISTS 633 (June 1981); AMERICAN
HOSPITAL Ass'NS, HOSPITAL MEDICAL RECORDS 4-8 (1972); see also U.S. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3rd Cir. 1980) ("It has been recognized in
various contexts that medical records and information stand on a different plane
than other relevant material" (comparing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 35
and 26(b); citing exemption for medical files under the Freedom of Information Act,

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6))).

95. A number of courts have found that arrest records constitute such a
significant threat to privacy because of the consequences of disclosure that the
constitutional right to privacy affords the subject the right to expunge the record or
to some other type of relief. See Davison v. Dill, 180 Colo. 123, 503 P.2d 157 (1957);
Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971). But see Tosh v. Buddies
Supermarkets, Inc., 482 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1973) (disclosure of criminal histories of
union organizers by police to business person does not violate constitution because
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is not intimate. But disclosure of information about assets or liabilities
could result in unwanted solicitation from various sources and encourage lawsuits or other harassing activities, including the possibility
of being subject to extortion or kidnapping. Because of the consequential features of information involving one's financial status or
exposure to the criminal justice system, such information is highly
personal in the sense that a perception of embarrassment or possible
harmful consequences from disclosure would be reasonable and is
recognized in legal norms. 96 Compelled disclosure of highly personal
information constitutes a sufficiently serious threat to privacy to
satisfy the threshold requirement in challenges grounded in the constitutionally based informational privacy right. It is the acquisition by
the government of intimate information or information of a highly
personal nature, in the sense above described, that implicates the
constitutional right to informational privacy.
2.

Is The Intrusion Into Privacy Justified: The Flexible Weighing

of Interest Test

As previously mentioned, the standard of judicial review for
informational privacy claims is flexible. The threshold determination
is that the nature of the information is such that a significant invasion
of privacy will occur if there is compelled disclosure by the government. Courts have been most receptive to informational privacy rights
claims when such claims have been raised to block governmental
requests for health care information which, if publicly disclosed,
would constitute a significant invasion of privacy. As previously
discussed, intimate information about someone's physical condition,
and her family and personal relationships, embody the most basic
subject of privacy. Non-consensual disclosure of such information
violates our sense of self-respect, human dignity and personhood.
Once'the threshold determination is satisfied in respect to requests
of legitimate
Comm., 109
Act (FOIA)
enforcement

need to know). See also United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
S. Ct. 1468 (1989). Section 552(b)(7)(c) of the Freedom of Information
excludes from disclosure records or information compiled for law
purposes "to the extent that the production of such law enforcement

records or information ...

could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted

invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988). In Reporters Committee, the Court held that this section precludes disclosure of FBI "rap sheets"
under FOIA because the compilation of information in these arrest records implicated
significant privacy interests of the subject. Reporters Committee, 109 S. Ct. at 1485.
96. See generally discussion by the California Supreme Court in City of Carmelby-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225 (1970).
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for health care information, a flexible weighing of interests test is
utilized to determine whether the invasion of privacy is constitutionally
justified.
This approach of weighing the competing interests, as in other
areas of intermediate review in constitutional law, contributes to ad
hoc, fact sensitive determinations of violations of constitutional rights.
However, it would be a mistake to conclude from these intrinsic
features of intermediate review that there is no bite to the standard.
A significant burden is in fact placed upon the government to justify
serious invasions of privacy through compelled disclosure of health
care information. In some instances the invasion of privacy may be
so significant that privacy will override important interests that are
furthered by disclosure. At the very least there is a force to the
demonstration of loss of privacy that requires that important interests
in fact be furthered and that where privacy may be preserved or
protected the government be required to do so.
The flexibility of the weighing of interest concept facilitates taking
into account the multiple values and policies that are at stake when
health care information is sought by the government. Concerns about
limiting access to health care information reflect both the need to
protect the privacy of the patient and the policy of preserving the
integrity of the professional-patient relationship so that there will be
unfettered communication between the patient and professional. In
some instances, therefore, the weighing process involves multiple
values competing against the government interest that is asserted to
be furthered by disclosure.
B. THE UNITED STATES V. WESTINGHOUSE ELEC. CORP. TEST FOR
JUSTIFIABLE INVASIONS OF PRIVACY

When the Director of the National Institute for Occupational
Safety obtained a federal court subpoena ordering an employer to
disclose information that was contained in the medical records of
employees, the employer argued that such disclosure violated the
constitutional right to informational privacy of the employees. This
contention was rejected by the district court and the third circuit court
of appeals. However, the third circuit's decision in United States v.
Westinghouse 97 has been viewed as a standard for evaluation of
constitutional informational privacy claims. In Westinghouse, the
third circuit concluded no violation of the constitutional rights of
employees occurred upon compelled disclosure because the invasion
97. 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980).
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of privacy was justified. The third circuit described the factors to be
considered in determining whether the intrusion into privacy is justified as: (1) the type of health record and the type of health care
information that is requested; (2) the potential for harm in any
subsequent non-consensual disclosure of the information; (3) the
injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated; (4) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized
disclosure; and, (5) the degree of need for access. 9
The Westinghouse five part analysis reflects, in a general way,
the basic features of the constitutional right to informational privacy
as it has evolved. On the non-disclosure side, the analysis considers
intrinsic and consequential features of the health care information
requested to determine the significance of the invasion of privacy that
is involved by the disclosure, the risk of further invasions of privacy,
and the importance of preserving the integrity of the relationship. On
the disclosure side, the government's need to know is to be evaluated
in terms of the strength of public policy as expressed in both explicit
statutory norms and other governmental interests. An important
factor in the Westinghouse calculus is the extent to which the government has secured the health care information that has been acquired
against unjustifiable access and dissemination. 99 Some discernible
trends have emerged from consideration of these factors when health
care information is requested by the government and challenged on
informational privacy grounds.
C. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON HIV STATUS AND FOR
INFORMATION DISCLOSED IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

The richest development of the constitutional right to informational privacy has occurred when intimate and personal health care

98. Id. at 578.

99. See, e.g., Barry v. New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1561 (2d Cir. 1983) cert.

denied sub nom. Slevin v. City of New York, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983). See also, the

interesting discussion by Professor Smith of this feature of the Westinghouse standard
in, Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional To Give It Out): Caller
Identification Technology and The Right to Informational Privacy, 37 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 145, 176 n.151 (1989) (citing, Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia,
812 F.2d 105, 118 (3d Cir. 1987) where the 3rd circuit enjoined use of employment

application form until confidentiality regulations were promulgated) and Shane v.
Buck, 658 F. Supp. 908, 917 (D. Utah 1985) (where the district court found adequate

safeguards against unjustifiable dissemination of information on Form 1583).
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information has been sought by courts, grand juries, or other government agencies. Where courts or grand juries seek such information
and the constitutional right to privacy is raised to block disclosure, if
the claim of right prevails, the right functions as a constitutionally
based evidentiary or testimonial privilege. Several states have recognized this privacy based constitutional privilege. 100
The greatest weight is given to privacy claims when the health
care information sought is that which was acquired in psychotherapy,
or is medical information about whether a person has been infected
with HIV. The special force of privacy arguments in these instances
is based Upon both the intrinsic and consequential features of such
information. Psychotherapy involves revelation by the patients of
their innermost thoughts: their fantasies, fears, and anxieties of the
person in the most intimate sense-their inner psychic realities. Public
disclosure of such information may have harmful consequences not
only because antisocial attitudes may be expressed that will not be
understood, but also because a stigma may still attach to someone
being treated in psychotherapy. Beyond that, compelled disclosure
arguably causes greater harm to the therapeutic relationship than to
other professional patient or client relationships. This is because "the
talk is the treatment" in psychotherapy and promoting a relationship
of trust is necessary for the open disclosure that is a sine qua non for
treatment itself.'0'
The intrinsic and consequential feature of HIV-related information strongly implicate privacy. AIDS is a communicable, incurable,
100. See generally Turkington, Legal Protection for the Confidentiality of Health
Care Information in Pennsylvania: Patient and Client Access; Testimonial Privileges;
Damage Recovery for Unauthorized Extra-Legal Disclosure, 32 ViLL. L. REv. 259,
349-61 (1987). The development of a constitutionally-based privilege has formally

occurred in at least four states: Alaska, California, Pennsylvania and Florida. See
Falcon v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977); In re Lifshutz,

2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-35, 467 P.2d 557, 567-70, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839-42 (1970); In re
B, 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978); Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service,

500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).

101. See generally R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVI-

LEGED COMMUNICATION (1966). Professor Slovenko states the crucial role of com-

munications in psychotherapy to be as follows:
In psychotherapy, however, every statement is a link in a chain. Thus, all
statements are relevant to treatment, and require confidentiality. All physicians may discuss matters with their patients which have no relevance to
illness, but in psychotherapy, almost all, if not all, statements are pertinent
to and essential for treatment.
Id. at 33.
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sexually transmitted disease that is viewed by many members of the
society as significantly associated with homosexual activities and drug
abuse. There continues to be mounting evidence that those perceived
as being infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, are treated
with ostracism, discrimination and violence. Given these medical and
social facts about AIDS, public disclosure of HIV related information
constitutes the most serious invasion of privacy. In the case of HIV
related information, protecting the privacy of the patient also promotes the policy of protecting the public health by encouraging
voluntary testing. 0 2
Where the request for health care information arises in formally
initiated litigation and is based upon a determination that the information is relevant to issues before the court, disclosure is justified on
behalf of the interest in truth-seeking that would be furthered by
disclosure. This is a powerful government interest that is given great
weight in the face of constitutional privacy claims. The success of the
claims in the weighing process turns, in some instances, upon whether
the request for the information arises in a lawsuit that was initiated
by the patient. 03 Where this is the case, the privacy interest is
diminished either under the view that the patient has impliedly consented to disclosure by the suit or under the view that it would not
be fair to allow the patient to bring the issue of his or her medical
condition into a lawsuit and then shield relevant evidence from the
court or the opposing party.
When the request for health care information is made as part of
a formally initiated lawsuit that is not brought by the patient or
client, or the requested information is pursuant to a grand jury
investigation, careful attempts to weigh the competing interests are
made. In this weighing of interests, if the privacy interests are strong,
they may trump or override the interest in truth-seeking. At the very
least, if the interest in truth-seeking may be furthered by alternative
means that do not require that the subject's privacy be invaded, these
alternatives must be utilized.1 °4
The paridigm of weighing the governmental interest in truthseeking with strong privacy interests at stake is Rasmussen v. South
102. See generally Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HIV-Related Information: An Analytic Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 VILL. L.
REv. 871 (1989). For an excellent summary of current medical and social facts about
AIDS and the role of protecting privacy in efforts to manage the epidemic, as well
as the use of judicial notice to establish medical and social facts in a case involving
the constitutional right to informational privacy, see Doe v. Borough of Barrington,
729 F. Supp. 376 (D. N.J. 1990).
103. See In re Lifshutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).
104. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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Florida Blood Service. 0 In Rasmussen, the Florida Supreme Court
responded to a request for disclosure of a list of blood donors named
in a negligence action. The request was made of a blood bank with
the view that the donor list was relevant' to prove negligence on the
part of a physician and hospital in administering blood contaminated
by HIV to the plaintiff. The Rasmussen court denied access to the
donor list because disclosure would deprive the donors of their
constitutional right to informational privacy and chill prospective
blood donors from participating in the voluntary blood supply system. °0In Rasmussen the right to informational privacy and the policy
of preserving a voluntary blood supply combined to trump the interest
in truth-seeking. Other courts that have considered the informational
privacy claim in cases where HIV status is sought to determine
negligence in administering contaminated blood have accommodated
the competing interests by disclosure under circumstances where privacy would be substantially protected. In some instances general
information has been disclosed without disclosing the identity of the
individual.' 7 Other courts have disclosed the identity of the donor to
the plaintiff and assumed that confidentiality would be adequately
protected by appropriate directions to the plaintiff restricting further
unnecessary disclosure.' 0
D.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE LAWS

Numerous challenges to laws requiring disclosure of financial
affairs by government employees and officials have been made on the
105. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
106. Id. at 537 ("Our analysis of the interests to be served by denying discovery
does not end with the effects of disclosure on the private lives of the fifty-one donors
implicated in this case. Society has a vital interest in maintaining a strong volunteer
blood supply. . .

."

The court then concluded that the disclosure sought implicated

constitutionally protected privacy interests).
107. See Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C.
1989) (patient who had contacted HIV from contaminated blood not entitled to
discover identity of donor or to take "veiled disposition" of donor in order to
establish blood supplier's negligence).
108. See Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1987)
(patient who had contracted HIV from contaminated blood entitled to donor's name
but directed not to directly contact donor nor undertake further discovery regarding
donor until permitted to do so by court); see also Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood
Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988). In Belle Bonfls the court
authorized the plaintiff to submit written questions to the donor through the clerk
of the court. The clerk was provided with the identity of the donor for purposes of
communicating the questions and receiving the written answers. The plaintiff received
the written answers but was not provided with the identity of the donor. Id. at 1014.
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basis that such disclosure violates the right to privacy of the covered
persons. Courts have generally accepted the initial premise of these
challenges and found that the compelled disclosure of this information
implicates the informational right to privacy.' 09 Most disclosure laws
have been found to be justified invasions of privacy on the basis that
such disclosures further important interests. The privacy analysis in
financial disclosure cases has largely focused on the consequential
features of such information. Public disclosure of information about
a person's financial affairs is viewed as creating a threat of kidnapping
for ransom, as well as subjecting the person to unwarranted and
irritating solicitations, and potential embarrassment by disclosing
excesses in lifestyle or poverty." 0 These privacy interests have generally
been viewed as significant."' But then so have the interests asserted
in justification of disclosure.
Disclosure laws applicable to government employees are generally
justified as furthering governmental interests in deterring corruption
and conflicts of interest and enhancing public confidence in the
integrity of government." 2 Where financial disclosure laws are directed
109. See Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1014 (Colo. 1988).
110. See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 233,
85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
111. See Plante v. Gonzalez 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978).
Ranged against these important interests are the senators' interest in financial
privacy. Their interest is substartial. For better or for worse, money too
makes the world go round. Financial privacy is important not only for the
reasons the California Supreme Ceurt accepted: the threat of kidnapping,
the irritation of solicitations, the embarrassment of poverty ....

(citation

omitted) When a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, violation of privacy
is harmful without any concrete consequential damages. Privacy of personal
matters is an interest in and of itself, protected constitutionally ...

Id.

common law.

and at

In Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983), the court correctly
noted that there is greater invasion of privacy in the public inspection provisions of
financial disclosure laws than in the requirement for initial disclosure to the government. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1561. However, the court concluded that governmental
interest in preventing corruption and conflict of interests outweighed the invasion of
privacy that occurred from public inspection. Citing the press, the court concluded
that public access furthered the interest in preventing corruption beyond the self
policing that limiting disclosure of financial information to a government agency
would involve. In addition it found the argument that public access to this information
reasonably furthered the states interest in enhancing public confidence in the integrity
of government. Barry, 712 F.2d at 1563.
112. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); Plante v.
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at public officials, an additional governmental interest in participatory
democracy by informing the electorate is asserted. Public officials are

also found to have less constitutional protection for informational
privacy than private employees." 3 There is general agreement among
courts that the governmental interests that are furthered by financial
disclosure laws are weightier than the privacy interests of governmental
employees or public officials.
There are a few exceptions. In City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v.

Young," 4 the California Supreme Court found that a financial disclo-

sure law applicable to public officials constituted a violation of the
federal constitutional right to informational privacy. The Carmelcourt
imposed a greater burden of justification on the government for the
invasions of privacy that occur from financial disclosure laws than is
generally the case."' Four years later the California Supreme Court
upheld a financial disclosure statute that was more narrowly written

to further the state's interest in avoiding conflict of interests, in
County of Nevada v. MacMillen"6.

Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); Duplantier v. U.S., 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.
1979).
113. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135-36 (5th Cir. 1978).
114. 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
115. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 466 P.2d at 232 which applied a strict standard
of review to invalidate general requirement of disclosure by public officers and
candidates and their spouses and families of investments in excess of $10,000
unconstitutional because disclosure was not limited to investments that might involve
potential conflict of interest. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1563
(2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that the $30,000 salary requirement that
triggered the broad disclosure was unconstitutional because it was both overinclusive
and underinclusive:
We recognize that full disclosure is burdensome, and that some City
employees earning less than $30,000 might have opportunities for corruption,
while others earning more than $30,000 might not. Moreover, we agree with
the district court that the statute would be better if it specified the "particular
job categories" that should be subject to disclosure, and defendants themselves concede that "it may not be the time" to consider raising the threshold
for reporting "to take into account the effect of inflation since 1979."
Nonetheless, we cannot say that the statute must therefore fall. Ordinarily,
legislative classifications of this sort must stand unless "very wide of any
reasonable mark."
Id.
116. 11 Cal. 3d 662, 522 P.2d 1345, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1974) (statute provided
in part that certain officials were to disclose only financial interests that might effect
decisions of officials).
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COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION ON CHILD ABUSE

The national child abuse scandal has caused many states to enact
statutes that require educators and health professionals to report
evidence of child abuse to governmental agencies." 7 These laws generally restrict the government from further disclosure of the information about alleged child abuse under rigid confidentiality rules.
Such compulsory disclosure laws raise serious questions of informational privacy rights. If the information of child abuse was acquired
in a psychotherapy-client relationship, important losses of informational privacy occur by compulsory disclosure. Disclosure laws further
the most important interest in protecting young persons who are
unable to protect themselves from physical and emotional harm and
death. The child abuse disclosure laws present courts with a brutal
collision between privacy and preserving the physical and mental
health of children. In Pesce v. Sterling Morton High School District
201, Cook County I.," the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the applicability of the emerging constitutional right to informational privacy to the compelled disclosure of health care information
involving child abuse.
In Pesce, a tenured teacher, who was also a psychologist, failed
to promptly report evidence of sexual abuse of a student by a teacher
in violation of the Illinois Abuse and Neglected Child Reporting Act.
The school board suspended Pesce for five days without pay and
demoted him. He contested the action on the basis that it violated his
constitutional right to privacy." 9 Judge Cudahy, speaking for a unanimous court, held that the interest in protecting "one of the most
pitiable and helpless classes in society-abused children," overrode
the interest in privacy that was implicated by the compelled disclosure.120
117. Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High School, 830 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987). See
also Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Versus the
Clergy Privilege and Free Exercises of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 725 n.10

(1987) (collecting statutes).

118. 830 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987).

119. The Pesce court found that the psychologist had standing to raise the right

to informational privacy because the patient's and the psychotherapist's constitutional
right to privacy are basically "coextensive" in the context of the case. Pesce, 830
F.2d at 797. The court cited cases that involve the personal autonomy branch of the
constitutional right to privacy, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 55.

The right of health professionals and health care facilities to raise the informational
privacy rights of patients have been recognized in other cases where compelled

disclosure of health care information was in issue. See supra note 95 and cases cited

therein.
120. The court concluded that the state's interest in protecting abused children
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F. DISSEMINATION OF HIGHLY PERSONAL OR INTIMATE
INFORMATION BY THE GOVERNMENT

If the Warren and Brandeis article launched the legal right to
privacy in our legal system, then recent decisions finding a violation
of the constitutional right to privacy for the dissemination of information constitute a logical thrust of this right. The cases that have
found constitutional violations have all involved serious invasions of
privacy by the government's dissemination. York v. Story 12 1 involved
distribution of pictures of the naked body; Woods v. White 122 and
Doe v. Barrington' 23 disclosure of someone's HIV status; and Carter
v. Broadlawns Medical Center,124 disclosure of health records to nonmedical personnel. Under the circumstances of these cases, the disclosures resulted in actual access to intimate information by numerous
members of the public and potential access by many others. There
was no justification for the dissemination in any of the cases. In York
v. Story, the dissemination was for the purely private use of government agents in pursuit of personal titillation; 25 in Woods 126 and
was compelling and the compelled disclosure would be constitutional even under the
strict scrutiny standard of review. See Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High School, 830
F.2d 798 (1987) ("Abused children can carry physical and emotional scars for a
lifetime ... the state bears a special responsibility to protect children who are unable
voluntarily to choose their own course of action.").
121. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
122. 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
123. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D. N.J. 1990).
124. 667 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D. Iowa 1987).
125. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963). This is clearly the case
regarding the dissemination of the photographs. Dissemination of the photographs
to other officers in York would not be of aid in the identification or arrest of the
criminal. The taking of the photographs in these circumstances was not essential to
prosecution of the case; proof of the assault might have been demonstrated without
them.
126. In Woods the allegation was made that medical personnel had discussed
the plaintiffs HIV status with other inmates and staff members at the prison. The
state made no claim that important- state interests were furthered by the disclosure.
Woods, 689 F. Supp. at 876. This is understandable given the emerging consensus
among the medical and scientific community about the modes of transmission of the
virus and the need for strict confidentiality of HIV related information. The basis of
the factual allegations in the case and the disclosures would not be justifiable on the
basis of protecting persons against physical harm from infection of the virus. See
Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 686 F. Supp. 243,
251 (D. Neb. 1988), aff'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989) (mandatory testing of
employees that come in contact with retarded children was an unreasonable search
of employees in violation of the fourth amendment because given the medical facts
about transmission of AIDS the risk of infection of the children was, "extremely
low . . . approach[ing] zero").
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Barrington,127 the recipients of the information about the HIV status
had no valid right to know-they were not at risk from infection
through transmission, nor were they involved in treatment of the
subject. In Carter, the chaplain who was given access to the health
records was not directly involved in treatment and his consulting
services could have been fulfilled by general information that did not
require full access to the details of the health record.' 28
The sparsity of precedent holding that government dissemination
constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to privacy is a
reflection in part of the recentness of the non fourth amendment
informational privacy rights development. It is also a reflection of
the judiciary's reluctance to commit its resources to a general review
of whether the dissemination of information by the government is
justified. Yet unlimited authority by the government to disclose what
it knows about individuals would constitute an intolerable threat to
that individual as a person and an affront to human dignity. This
proposition is reflected in numerous legal norms in our system.
Freedom of Information and Right to Know Acts contain provisions
that prevent general dissemination of much highly personal and
intimate information in the possession of the government. Statutory
proscriptions against unjustified disclosure of such information are
29
also commonplace.
The constitutional right to informational privacy as it applies to
dissemination of information reflects a residual safety valve function
of constitutional protection for immunity from access by the government to us as persons. The right is a general response to the failure
of the government to demonstrate proper respect for confidentiality
and privacy for the information that it acquires about a person. When
it is shown that the government has acquired information that if
publicly disseminated would seriously implicate privacy because of its
127. In Barrington, police officers told a neighbor of someone that had AIDS,
that he had the disease and that his wife was likely to have the disease. He did not
know if, nor was there any evidence that, anything but casual conduct had occurred
between the AIDS sufferer and the neighbor. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. at 378.
128. In Carter, a county hospital established a "chaplain" position at the
hospital to provide patients and their families with counseling for the grief that
accompanied the hospitalization. The court concluded that general information about
the condition of the patient would provide the chaplain with sufficient information
for counseling and that by making the records available to non health personnel, the
county hospital did not properly respect a "patient's confidentiality and privacy."
Carter, 667 F. Supp. at 1282-83.
129. See supra notes 24 and 26 and statutes cited therein; see also supra note
90; cf. supra note 25.
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intrinsic and consequential features, and dissemination of that information occurs because of inadequate security of the information,
courts find the constitutional protection against invasions of privacy
to be implicated. 3 0 The essence Of the constitutional right to informational privacy for dissemination of information is expressed in the
incipient development of this concept by the fact that all of the cases
have involved highly personal or intimate information that has been
disseminated for purely private purposes or that is unrelated to the
public purpose that is asserted as a justification for the invasion of
privacy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In 1975 the Supreme Court referred to the Warren and Brandeis
publication as the "root article"'' of the right to privacy. In the
century since the publication of that article, several branches of the
legal right to privacy have sprouted. A major trunk of the legal right
to privacy is the right to decide who shall have access to highly
personal or intimate information about persons. Branches of the right
to informational privacy include rights that are protected in tort and
constitutional law. Warren and Brandeis argued for recognition of a
common law privacy right for the unjustified dissemination of information by the press to the general public. The theoretical foundations
of their argument for recognition of a tort right to privacy provided
an intellectual base for recognition of a more general right to informational privacy. The base was that privacy is viewed as an important
value in conventional morality and that privacy was a part of those
essential rights that we hold as moral and legal persons in society.
Numerous philosophers, jurists and scholars have embellished upon
the bareboned ideas that were expressed in the article on the conceptual and intellectual foundations of the right to privacy. It has also
been demonstrated that the general views expressed in the article may
not have originated with Warren and Brandeis.
Even if that is the case, recognition in our legal system of
informational privacy rights in a broad range of areas is a kind of
societal celebration of the article. These developments are a reflection
of the tradition generated by the article of recognizing the need to
provide legal protection for invasions of privacy. Support for the
right is found in conventional morality and the basic notion that
130. Cf. L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-16, at 1398-1400 (2d
ed. 1988).
131. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975).
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privacy is an essential ingredient of personhood; the scope of the
right is limited by an assessment of the sufficiency of the justification
for the invasion of privacy by the government, private individuals or
business entities.
In the evolution of privacy rights that I have focussed on in this
article, state and federal constitutions have been construed to protect
individuals from unjustifiable invasions of privacy that occur when
highly personal or intimate information is acquired or disseminated
about them by the government. This incipient constitutional right is
triggered by government action that does not constitute a search
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The constitutional
informational privacy right is part of constitutionally protected liberties that are independent of the fourth amendment. For this reason
I refer to the right as the unencumbered constitutional right to
informational privacy.
This emerging branch of the constitutional right to informational
privacy provides a basic protection for the immunity of us as persons.
It is a recognition of the inviolability of each moral personality as
this idea has evolved from the intellectual tradition that has flowed
from the article by Warren and Brandeis. The right has functioned to
provide a basic protection for the immunity of us as persons by
recognizing that highly personal and intimate information about us
ought not be acquired and disseminated by the government unless it
furthers a valid governmental function and efforts are made to prevent
gratuitous and excessive public access to the information.

